Defense budget control in the event of emergency by Sakunaka, Masakazu
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-06
Defense budget control in the event of emergency
Sakunaka, Masakazu














DEFENSE BUDGET CONTROL 




By: Masakazu Sakunaka 
June 2013 
 
Advisors: Juanita M. Rendon 





Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
DEFENSE BUDGET CONTROL 
IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Masakazu Sakunaka 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.  IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to give recommendations to the government of Japan for better provision of budget in 
contingent situations. To accomplish the objective, this thesis explains how a government should control the provision 
of adequate and timely budgets in the military. Literature shows that routine budget process has a control function and 
four basic steps. A shorter process to fund emergencies is found in the U.S’s practical cases for contingency funding, 
though there are some risks of misuse. If the contingency funds cannot provide adequate money, supplemental 
appropriations are enacted. Japan has a supplemental budget and a national reserve fund. Learning from the practice 
of the U.S., Japan should set aside its national reserve fund for possible contingent events. In addition, Japan should 
make use of the national reserve fund and a supplemental budget for providing enough money in the event of an 
emergency. The government of Japan and the Diet should pay attention to keep control of the budget for the nation as 










14. SUBJECT TERMS Contingency Fund, Supplemental Appropriations, National Reserve Fund, 
Supplemental Budget 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
51 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
DEFENSE BUDGET CONTROL 




Lieutenant Commander, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force 
B.A., National Defense Academy, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 




















   Philip J. Candreva 




   William R. Gates, Dean 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
 v 
DEFENSE BUDGET CONTROL 
IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY 
 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to give recommendations to the government of Japan for 
better provision of budget in contingent situations. To accomplish the objective, this 
thesis explains how a government should control the provision of adequate and timely 
budgets in the military. Literature shows that routine budget process has a control 
function and four basic steps. A shorter process to fund emergencies is found in the U.S’s 
practical cases for contingency funding, though there are some risks of misuse. If the 
contingency funds cannot provide adequate money, supplemental appropriations are 
enacted. Japan has a supplemental budget and a national reserve fund. Learning from the 
practice of the U.S., Japan should set aside its national reserve fund for possible 
contingent events. In addition, Japan should make use of the national reserve fund and a 
supplemental budget for providing enough money in the event of an emergency. The 
government of Japan and the Diet should pay attention to keep control of the budget for 
the nation as the U.S. does. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
In 2010, the Japanese government revised the National Defense Program 
Guidelines (NDPG) because the security environment has changed since the previous 
program was established in 2005. Defense of Japan (the Annual White Paper on Defense) 
states a major characteristic of the 2010 NDPG is the “Dynamic Defense Force” (Japan 
Ministry of Defense, 2012, p. 115). There were some potential issues in the region 
surrounding Japan since the 1990s. For example, after a Chinese fishery vessel recently 
collided with Japan Coast Guard vessels off the coast of Senkaku Islands in 2010, and 
ships belonging to Chinese governmental entities intruded on Japanese territorial waters 
(Japan Ministry of Defense, 2012, p. 36). As the situation is getting sensitive, it is 
assumed a military contingency may arise. According to Pearson’s dictionary, a 
contingency is “an event or situation that might happen in the future, especially one that 
could cause a problem” (Pearson, 2003). In this thesis, contingency is defined as events 
that the military can dispatch in an emergency situation. It may be about time that the 
Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) takes action to help demonstrate the nation’s will and 
its defense capabilities. Considering the possible need to deploy the JSDF at a moment’s 
notice, how can the Japanese government provide adequate financial resources quickly 
and seamlessly to protect national security while observing fiscal responsibility? 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to give recommendations to the government of Japan 
for better provision of budget in contingency situations. To accomplish this objective, the 
following primary research question is addressed in this thesis. In the event of an 
emergency, such as contingent incidents, disasters, and wars, how should a government 
control the provision of adequate and timely budgets to the military? To answer the 
primary research question, several underlying questions will be addressed.  
• How does the budgeting process work as a control measure of public 
expenditure?  
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• What is the difference between the routine budgeting process and the one 
required during a national emergency?  
• How does the U.S. handle contingencies in actual cases? 
• What are the differences or similarities between contingency budgeting in 
Japan and the U.S.?  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Using information gleaned from a review of the literature examining the basic 
functions and principles of public budgeting, this thesis addresses the basic elements of 
routine budgeting that are often overlooked during a national emergency. The practices 
used for contingency budgeting in the U.S. will be evaluated against the characteristics of 
effective routine budgeting. After comparing the Japanese budgeting system with the U.S. 
system, a more effective method for Japan is addressed based on the practice of the U.S. 
examples. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
In Chapter II, through the literature review, this thesis explores the significance of 
budgets, the controls applied in the routine budgeting process, and the modification of the 
budgeting process to meet special circumstances. This chapter also describes the four 
basic tasks in relation to the contingency budgeting process. Chapter III summarizes 
supplemental appropriations and contingency funds that the U.S. has used to fund 
contingencies. Chapter IV introduces the Japanese supplemental budget and national 
reserve fund and addresses the similarities and differences between the U.S. and Japan in 
this regard. Chapter V concludes with an examination of U.S. contingency funding 
methods and makes recommendations regarding these methods for Japan. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter, through the literature review, explains contemporary meanings of 
budget and control measures of public expenditure. In the latter part of this chapter, the 
principles of public expenditure management, which indicate the preferable environment 
for sound budget, are introduced. 
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BUDGETS 
1. Budget Functions 
Wildavsky (1964) observes various meanings of budget which are summarized by 
Jones (2012). In contrast, Kramer (1979) simply states three basic uses of a budget, 
which are control, management, and planning. The two literatures raise different features, 
but control and planning are in common. As far as the ideas that Wildavsky (1964) 
proposed, Jones (2012) succinctly summarized them into nine points.  
• Budgeting has to do with the transformation of financial resources into 
human purposes. Thus, a budget may be considered as a set of goals with 
price tags attached for execution sectors.  
• A budget is a mechanism for making choices among alternative 
expenditures because funds are limited and have to be divided in one way 
or another. A budget can also be viewed as a plan or work plan for 
executing public policies. 
• If the nation is interested in implementing a policy with the least cost, 
which is often required by taxpayers, a budget is an instrument that 
enables a nation to achieve this objective efficiently. 
• From a different perspective, a budget is regarded as a contract. Funds are 
supplied under specified conditions, and entities given the funds must 
realize the fund’s purpose. On the other hand, authorities such as Congress 
and department heads have obligations to supply funds appropriately. 
These mutual obligations signify a budget functioning as a contract. 
• Proposed budgets that responsible agencies submit to a budget authority 
contain certain expectations for more money. Allocated dollar amounts 
indicate the agencies’ preference to the budget authority or decision 
maker. This is important information for the next budget planning cycle. 
• A precedent is a budget item that has been funded before and is highly 
likely to be funded again. 
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• “A tool to coordinate and control” (Jones, Candreva, & Devore, 2012, p. 
3). “One budget coordinates diverse activities so that they complement 
one another in the achievement of common goal” (Wildavsky, 1964, p. 4). 
“Another budget may be put together primarily to discipline subordinate 
officials within a governmental agency by reducing amounts for their 
salaries and their project” (Wildavsky, 1964). There are the control 
functions of a budget. 
• A budget is a call to supporters to mobilize support for an agency when 
programs appear to be underfunded or losing ground to other programs. 
• “A representation in monetary terms of governmental activity” 
(Wildavsky, 1964). 
This summary of Wildavsky’s descriptions is eloquent in terms of reflecting the 
modern American budgeting process. These functions define what government will do as 
a matter of routine and the control of those activities across political branches and within 
the executive. When a contingency happens, the budget for the matter may lose its 
functions such as a mechanism for alternative expenditure because the matter has to be 
dealt with urgently and as a priority, but it also requires political and management control. 
Kramer (1979) says that a “budget has three main uses: control, management, and 
planning. A budget controls administrators by tying them to the stated policies of their 
superiors and legislative overseers. Control through budget is obtained through 
accounting practices and reporting procedures that restrict the transfer of funds from one 
account to another, limit the number of positions available to an agency, and create 
mountains of paper work” (Kramer, 1979, p. 5). These practices discourage financial 
malfeasance and encourage fiscal integrity. “The management aspect of a budget works 
in carrying out the approved plan of policies and makes the implementation efficient and 
effective” (Kramer, 1979, p. 5). These explanations depict actual governmental budgeting 
processes which are mainly carried out in the lower levels of the financial management 
organization. 
2. Ten Principles of Sound Budgeting 
The literature reviewed so far examines budgets as a tool of control, which is how 
it is used by governments in developed countries. In order to understand how budgeting 
might look ideally, one may consult the Public Expenditure Management Handbook (The 
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World Bank, 1998). The information in this document was written for countries in which 
the system of governance is still developing, but it is meaningful here. Budgets have 
multiple purposes as a tool to exert legal control of executives, to allocate resources to 
strategic priorities, to promote macroeconomic stability, and to ensure managerial 
efficiency (The World Bank, 1998, p. 1). The handbook advocates the 10 principles of 
good budgeting and financial management as follows.  
Comprehensiveness and discipline: An effective public budget takes a holistic 
approach to societal problems and the processes for collecting revenue and allocating 
those resources across capital and operating expenses should be appropriately linked to 
those goals. Also, a budget must encompass all the fiscal operations of government and 
force policy decisions. Disciplined processes restrain government in the amount of 
spending and the breadth of things on which it spends. 
Legitimacy: In order to keep legitimacy, the decision-makers with the authority 
to be able to change the policy during the execution of the policy, or during budget 
formulation, should participate in policy decisions. For example, the department or 
agency responsible for implementing a policy should understand how their budget has 
been requested and authorized by their higher line of command. 
Flexibility: Financial managers who execute a budget may need to respond to the 
situation in its sole discretion beyond the programmed decision when they get the 
relevant information about the changed situation. In that case, transparency and 
accountability should be included. 
Predictability: The budget process and amounts should be predictable so that 
decision-makers, managers, and the public can rely upon a standard process and can have 
faith that decisions, once made, will be implemented.  
Contestability: Tentative decisions should be contestable by those with a stake in 
the proposed policies. This factor in policy development ensures that policy will be 
refined and improved, and stakeholders have a voice in the process. 
Honesty: A budget should be allocated with balanced revenue and expenditure. 
Biased allocation of budgets, such as allotting generous funds to lobbyist-guided 
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programs, misdirects strategic priority and kills the efficiency and effectiveness of policy 
implementation. 
Information: Complete and unbiased information supports honesty and sound 
decision making. Accurate and timely information on costs, outputs, and outcome is 
essential.   
Transparency and accountability: Keeping transparency and accountability is 
important to manage and control a budget and its execution. Although flexibility could be 
a reason to weaken control of tight budget execution, obligations for transparency and 
accountability encourage deliberate use of funds.  
Some of these ten principles can apply to controls in the event of an emergency. 
For example, in a contingency situation, the situation is not predictable and there is no 
information beforehand. Therefore, it is difficult to budget for it. If the contingency 
budget will use a different process, that new process still must be comprehensive and 
flexible to adapt to conditions and must be based on good information and be accountable 
for the nation. 
3. Budget Development Process 
This literature review illustrates the various aspects of budgets. From another 
perspective, four basic tasks are observable in budgeting processes. First, budgets 
propose policy. Wildavsky (1964) says “a budget is a mechanism for making choice” (p. 
2).  This means a budget proposes political choice. Kramer addresses how budgets can be 
used for planning. This also means a budget proposes a plan based on governmental 
policy. Thus, it can be said that budgets propose a policy. 
Second, budgets approve and enact the policy. “A budget may be regarded as a 
contract” (Wildavsky, 1964, p. 2).  In the process of budgeting, budgets approve policy in 
order to allocate monetary resources. At times, budget authorities also approve the 
implementation of a policy. 
Third, budgets literally fund the policy. In terms of the budget cycle, policy 
authorization and funding policy occur at the same time. Technically speaking, though, 
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there are some more processes required to complete the policy, such as authorization, 
appropriation, and obligation. This is the routine process of budgeting. 
Fourth, as Kramer (1979) described, budgets control the bureaucracy. Strict 
accounting practices and reporting regulations prevent fraud and abuse of budgets. Also, 
information to maintain transparency and accountability can control behavior of 
bureaucracy.  
B. CONTROLS IN THE ROUTINE BUDGETING PROCESS 
1. Controls Seen in Ten Principles of Sound Budgeting 
The ten principles of sound budgeting include the concept of control. For example, 
flexibility could be a reason to weaken controls of tight budget execution. On the other 
hand, ensuring transparency and accountability may encourage controls with using proper 
information. Information enables budgets to be executed in a timely and accurate way, 
and it also helps control of expenditure management. 
2. Controls in Management Cycle of Budgeting 
Kramer (1979) says budgets have a function of management. The management 
cycle is one of the control measures. Among the activities included in this cycle are 
reviews of previous plans and budget implementations through monitoring and 
accountability. Evaluation of the implementation and audit process, which is part of the 
cycle, is reported to the public. The review is reflected in the next policy making and 
budgeting period. Entities that undertake actions and budget are attentive about 
implementation when they know how the cycle works. This is why the management cycle 
is a key control measure. The Public Expenditure Management Handbook (The World 
Bank, 1998) shows the management cycle of policy, planning, and budgeting. (Figure1). 
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Figure 1.  Linking policy, planning, and budgeting in the planning and resource 
management cycle (From The World Bank, 1998). 
3. PPBE System as a Routine Process 
a. Overview of Relationship with OMB and Congress 
The budgeting process for the military in the U.S. is called the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. The defense department 
budgets across a five year time horizon, and each year they update the previous budget 
cycle and submit their budget plan to Office of Management and Budget (OMB). After 
review, the President’s Budget is submitted to Congress. Congress scrutinizes the budget, 
calls individuals to examine the programs in the proposed budget, and modifies the 
President’s Budget to reflect their policy preferences. The budget is enacted through the 
Authorization and Appropriation Acts (Jones, 2012). The process balances the power 
between the executive branch who proposes, and later executes, the budget and the 
legislative branch who decides on the final budget. With regard to the control of 
Congress in defense spending, Woodruff (2006) explains the process in detail. 
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b. Plan, Program, Budgeting Phase 
The defense budget is based on the National Security Strategy (NSS), the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). “The goal 
of planning, with respect to resource allocation decision making, is to identify any gaps 
or overmatches between the national military strategy and the extant and pending 
capabilities, and to produce objectives for the programming phase to address them” 
(Jones, 2012, p. 118). The final product of this phase is Defense Programming Guidance 
(DPG) issued by Secretary of Defense. DPG directs programming priority to the military 
departments. There is no control framework in this phase in terms of budgetary amount. 
However, there are some effective constraints in which the force’s capability is limited to 
the extent of achieving those strategies.  
As the work transitions to the programming phase, resource allocation 
decisions get more challenging and a budget constraint is imposed by the fiscal guidance 
(FG). “The goal of programming is to allocate resources, constrained by the fiscal 
guidance (FG) and appropriations rules, among programs across a mid- range time 
horizon that best achieves the objectives defined in the Defense Programming Guidance 
(DPG)” (Jones, 2012, p. 121). The principal product in this phase is the Program 
Objectives Memorandum (POM). 
The budgeting phase produces the budget justification books which 
provide the detailed budget information for each program. For example, they provide 
Congress with information composed of various tables and exhibits in the analytical 
perspectives, Historical Tables, the Appendices and other documentation that comprise 
the President’s Budget. As Jones (2012) indicates, “the primary aims of the budgeting 
phase are to ensure those justification books accurately describe the decisions made in the 
POM, are aligned with and reflect the plans to accomplish the NSS, NDS, NMS and other 
planning documents and are formatted in a fashion that serves the legislative function”  (p. 
131). In short, budgeting phase exists to justify the budget and policy in coordination.  
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c. Execution Phase 
In contrast to the programming and budgeting phase, the executing phase 
is about policy output and outcome, not policy choice. “The goal of execution is to 
implement the programs and policies that were described in the budget--as approved or 
modified in the authorization and appropriation process--in order to deliver the desired 
military capabilities, and to feed information into subsequent rounds of the PPB process” 
(Jones, 2012, p. 140). Because the budget that is executed is provided in the statute (the 
Authorization and Appropriation Acts), there are strict controls over what may be 
purchased and when it may be purchased. Controls also ensure no more is spent than was 
authorized. 
C. SHORTER PROCESS TO FUND EMERGENCIES 
As summarized in the previous two sections, creating budgets occurs in four basic 
steps, and routine budgeting processes are effective at controlling routine activity. 
However, some federal level incidents, such as disaster relief and defense concerns, are 
not routine, and these incidents require a special process to deal with them in a timely and 
adequate manner. For example, after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, a 
supplemental appropriation was requested by the President. One week later, Congress 
approved the request without “strings” and appropriated twice as much money as the 
President requested (Candreva & Jones, 2005, p. 110). Normally, the President would 
have proposed policy first, but policy proposal was skipped because of urgency and 
clarity of the problem. In most cases, there is no need to debate whether a response is 
required, so the process is accelerated. Only an appropriation is required and not an 
authorization. Whereas the normal budget process takes more than a year to formulate 
and another eight months to enact; a supplemental emergency budget may take just 
weeks to prepare and approve, and in extreme cases, it can be done in just days. 
This chapter explained contemporary meanings of budget and control measures of 
public expenditure. In addition, the principles of public expenditure management, which 
indicate the preferred environment for sound budget, were introduced. The next chapter 
will discuss the two ways that the U.S. has funded contingencies. 
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III. TWO WAYS THE U.S. HAS FUNDED CONTINGENCIES 
In the event of an emergency such as disasters and defense concerns, the U.S. 
government has provided funds in two ways. One is supplemental appropriation, and the 
other is contingency funding. This chapter describes the distinction between these two 
methods. Supplemental appropriation is provided after an emergency occurs, whereas 
contingency funding is prepared before the anticipated event of emergency. 
A. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION 
Supplemental appropriation is a budget provided in addition to the base-year 
budget for emergency response and humanitarian assistance. Supplemental appropriation 
is usually enacted by Congress more quickly than the base-year budget; the former is 
usually approved within four months, while the latter takes as long as eight months 
(Jones, 2012, pp. 201-205). Supplemental appropriation can be classified into two types.  
1. Lump-Sum Supplemental Appropriation 
A lump-sum supplemental appropriation is used for unexpected events whose cost 
is yet to be known and has not been borne. For example, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) requests a Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) every year up to 
$500 million. When a larger disaster happens that may deplete the DRF, the President 
may submit a request for emergency supplemental appropriation (Lindsay & Murray, 
2011, p. 8). This disaster-focused supplemental is basically a lump-sum appropriation 
focused on a goal and remediation of the disaster (McCaffery & Jerry, 2003, p. 70). In 
this sense, the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) enacted immediately after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11 is another example of lump-sum supplemental 
appropriation. Congress requires reporting the outlay of the lump sum for the sake of 
monitoring and overseeing the supplemental appropriation. In terms of provision, the risk 
is that there is no funding until the event occurs.  
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2. Specific Supplemental Appropriation 
This supplemental appropriation specifies the amount to be spent. The agency 
diverts funds from another use, and those funds will be reimbursed later by the specific 
supplemental. For example, when rescue and evacuation missions actually occur in the 
Navy, the Navy expends money from its existing operation and maintenance account. 
After the event, a specific supplemental appropriation is appropriated, and it will be 
repaid based on the actual cost. This supplemental appropriation is controlled because 
the details of the costs are known and clear. Congress could invalidate the supplemental 
appropriation in each account if they find that the Navy has spent from an original 
account improperly. In this case, a military operation may be funded from their diverted 
account without the approval of the legislature until supplemental money is requested. 
Military operations such as rescue and evacuation are ordered by the executive branch, 
but at times, diverted funding can be obligated without the approval of Congress. 
According to research on long-term military contingency operations (Evans, 
2006), the U.S. has several historical examples of contingency funding such as the 
Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, the Bosnia/Kosovo Conflict, and the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT). Supplemental appropriation had also been used for funding efforts 
to address unforeseen emergency situations before the Vietnam War. (Evans, 2006, p. 8)  
B. CONTINGENCY FUND 
A contingency fund is not part of the budgeting process, such as the base-year-
budget and supplemental budget. Rather, it is a fund set aside in advance for particular 
purposes, such as disaster and military contingency. The advantage of this fund is to 
provide necessary money immediately; whereas supplemental appropriations require at 
least a few months to pass Congress (McCaffery & Jerry, 2003, p. 60). Depending on the 
type of expense, the fund can be classified into two ways: contingency direct fund and 
contingency transfer fund.  
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1. Contingency Direct Fund 
A contingency direct fund is the fund that is spent directly from a pool of money 
provided in addition to the normal budget. For example, the DRF provides money for a 
typical disaster relief effort whose outlays are less than $500 million dollars.  
Suppose a hurricane disaster happens, the affected area gets flooded, and victims 
need food, blankets, medicines, etc. Some places have emergency stock, but most things 
must be procured and transported from an undamaged area. Federal or local government 
immediately can sign contracts to get the supplies and a means of transportation if they 
have a contingency direct fund. Also, they get credit for payment to companies which 
provide supplies. 
Rules for allocation of the DRF have been strictly established for years. After the 
President’s declaration, FEMA officials determine the needs of aid to individuals and 
entities. There are three assistance categories: Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, 
and Hazard Mitigation. The methodology for determining the budget request is well 
established in four data points (Lindsay & Murray, 2011, p. 5). The amount of enacted 
appropriations varies every year. Moreover, most years, supplemental appropriations are 
enacted (see Table 1). The DRF is requested by means of a strict methodology and 
distributed by a legitimate spending process. This is a way to control budget for a 
potential future event. If the fund is not sufficient, additional supplemental appropriation 
is approved. These clear and solid steps make this fund transparent and accountable. 
2. Contingency Transfer Fund 
A contingency transfer fund is established before a contingency. To spend the 
funds, they must be transferred into the usual account such as Operation and Maintenance. 
For example, the Overseas Contingency Transfer Fund (OCOTF) was established by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Appropriations Act, 1997, to meet operational 
requirements in support of emerging contingency operations without disrupting approved 
program execution or force readiness. This fund had supported contingency. However, 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) claimed that the DoD’s limited oversight and 
guidance had contributed to questionable use of the contingency fund (GAO, 2002, p. 18).  
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In another instance, the DERF was initially allowed to spend up to $100 million 
so that the DoD did not deplete the funds to accomplish their missions. After the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress provided a total of about $38 billion to the 
DERF as part of DoD efforts to support the Global War on Terror until 2003 (Inspector 
General, 2009, p. 1). At times, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued 
specific guidelines and criteria to apply in identifying and evaluating requirements to be 
funded. This was a special instruction to control the DERF, but the DoD did not provide 
enough guidance to military components on the use of the fund. (GAO, 2003, pp. 3-7) As 
a result, the needs for definitive guidance and increased oversight of contingency 
operations cost were recommended (GAO, 2003, p. 3). 
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Table 1.   Disaster Relief Fund (1989–2010). 
C. EVALUATION 
In the event of emergency, all four steps that propose policies, enact policies, fund 
policies, and control bureaucracy, are not necessary because there is usually not a choice. 
The event should be dealt with immediately, and funding must be made available  
without creating new policy. It still requires enactment, but that process is faster because 
there is no need for debate. 
Supplemental appropriations discussed in this chapter skip the step “propose 






1989 352 176 1,950 2,126
1990 451 164 1,919 2,083
1991 432 0 0 0
1992 286 288 6,207 6,495
1993 454 441 2,619 3,060
1994 1,698 430 7,530 7,960
1995 458 455 3,256 3,711
1996 445 309 4,408 4,717
1997 435 1,794 4,484 6,278
1998 3,623 428 2,141 2,569
1999 3,359 403 2,364 2,767
2000 3,521 3,521 0 3,521
2001 3,584 1,964 0 1,964
2002 1,660 805 0 805
2003 2,185 948 1,690 2,638
2004 2,258 2,078 2,555 4,633
2005 2,402 2,280 48,122 50,402
2006 2,315 1,915 6,491 8,406
2007 2,042 1,578 4,305 5,883
2008 2,035 1,419 11,108 12,527
2009 2,043 1,299 0 1,299
2010 2,000 1,600 5,100 6,700
(Constant Dollars 2010 in Millions)
Source : (Lindsay & Murray, 2011)
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terrorist attacks on September 11 is such a case which needs flexibility and which 
requires no debate to enact the appropriation. If the appropriated fund requires flexibility, 
it also needs information on the expense and accountability according to the ten 
principles. Regarding the characteristics of effective routine budgeting, controllability is 
questionable when contingency fund or supplemental appropriations are requested, 
because there is less information and accountability in this stage.  
Contingency funds are basically approved in base-year-budget and provide money 
for contingencies quickly. As they are approved in advance, they also take steps of 
proposing policies, enacting policies, and funding policies while “controlling 
bureaucracy.” This is because strict accounting practices and reporting regulations are not 
enough as the GAO reports in the OCOTF’s case.  
The U.S practice shows that the government and Congress maintain quickness 
and flexibility for funding contingencies by using contingency funds and supplemental 
appropriations. According to the reports of the GAO and Inspector General, both ways of 
funding do not have enough accountability and controllability. However, Congress and 
the GAO monitor the expense of the funds for the nation, and the OMB issues guidance 
for proper use of contingency funding.  It can be evaluated that, as a whole, the U.S. 
government tries to control the contingency fund without losing quickness and flexibility 
of funding. 
This chapter described the distinction between these two methods. Supplemental 
appropriation was provided after an emergency occurs, whereas contingency funding was 
prepared before the anticipated event of emergency. The next chapter will discuss 
contingency funding in Japan. 
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IV. CONTINGENCY FUNDING IN JAPAN 
This chapter introduces the Japanese budget system possibly adapted to 
contingency situations. According to Pearson’s dictionary, a contingency is “an event or 
situation that might happen in the future, especially one that could cause a problem” 
(Pearson, 2003). In this thesis, contingency is defined as events which the military can 
dispatch. Japan has a military equivalent service known as the Japan Self Defense Force 
(JSDF). Table 2 shows the record of major contingent events resolved by the JSDF since 
1990. This data on major contingent activities show the likelihood of contingency cases 
in the future. However, since there is not enough information about the budget related to 
these activities due to lack of disclosure, this chapter uses the specific example of a 
domestic disaster and international cooperation activity. 
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Table 2.   Major contingent activity of JSDF (1990–2010).  




Minesweeping activity in the 
Persian Gulf. Persian Gulf Apr.-Oct.1991 -
2
U.N Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia Cambodia Sep.1992-Sep.1993 600
3
Humanitarian Relief Operation 
for Rwandan Refugees Ruwanda Sep.-Dec.1994 378
4
Maritime security operation for 
spy ship off the Noto Peninsula Japan Sea Mar.1999 -
5
Transportation for disaster 
relief in Iran Japan to Iran Sep.-Nov. 1999 426
6 Anti-Terrorism Support Inian Ocean Nov.2001-Nov.2007 320
7
U.N Transitional Administration 
in Timor-Leste Timor-Leste Mar.2002-Jun.2004 405
8
Disaster relief activity the Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Kansai District Jan.-Apr.1995 over 10000
9
Humaritarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance in 
Iraq Iraq Jan.2004-Jul.2006 930
10
Maritime security operation for 
intorusion of submerged 
Chinese submarine into Japan's 
teritorial waters
South west sea of 
Japan Nov.2004 -
11
International Disaster Relief 
Activities in Thailand Thailand Dec.2004-Jan.2005 590
12
International Disaster Relief 
Activities in Indonesia Indonesia Jan.-Mar.2005 925
13
International Disaster relief 
Activities off Kamchatka Russia Aug.2005 346
14 Replenishment Support activity Indian Ocean Jan.2008-Feb.2010 330
15
Maritime security operation as 
a part of anti-pirecy measures 
off the Coast of Somaria Gulf of Aden Mar.-Jul.2009 -
16
Implementation of destruction 
measures for ballistic missiles 
and other weapons Around Japan Mar.-Apr.2009 -
17 Anti-piracy operation Gulf of Aden Jul.2009-present -
18
International desaster relief 
activities in Pakistan Pakistan Aug.-Oct.2010 514
Source: Defense of Japan 2011, Chronological Table and Reference 59
Note 1: "Major contingent activities"is defined by the number of mobilized personnel 
exceeded 300 in this table.  
Note 2: As the numbers of mobilized personnel of operations such as maritime security 
operation are not announced officially, all operations orderd by Ministry of Defense are in the 
table.
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A. SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET 
Public finance law article 29 allows for the establishment of a supplemental 
budget when an unexpected event happens after the normal budget has been formulated. 
The Diet establishes a supplemental budget every year, including the defense budget (see 
Table 3). Considering this law, the supplemental budget is available for contingency 
funding if the budgeting process is quick enough to deal with a contingency. As a matter 
of fact, the disaster relief activities in the Great East Japan Earthquake were funded by a 
supplemental budget which was enacted three times (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2011). 
The Diet approved the first supplemental budget in two months and passed two 
consecutive supplemental budgets for the sake of recovering from the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in 11 months. (Sakiyama, 2012, p. 3) Nine months after the disaster, the 
Reconstruction Agency was established to manage the recovery from the disaster. The 
budget request for recovery was shifted to the normal budget in 2012 (Sakiyama, 2012, p. 
10). This example indicates that the way of providing money to the Japan Ministry of 
Defense (JMOD). JMOD is similar to the U.S. specific supplemental case because JMOD 
requested the amount that they had spent to support the disaster relief effort based on cost 
reports from each of the armed services.   
A lump-sum supplemental appropriation seen in the U.S. budgeting method is not 
found in Japan. This is because Japan has a national reserve fund which has a similar 
function to the lump-sum supplemental appropriation method. 
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Table 3.   Total supplemental budget and defense related budget in Japan. 
B. NATIONAL RESERVE FUND 
Article 87 of the Constitution of Japan allows that “in order to provide for 
unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund may be authorized by the Diet to be 
expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet. The Cabinet must get subsequent 
approval of the Diet for all payments from the reserve fund.” (Prime Minister of Japan 

















1990 3,414 95 2.8% 4,159 2.3%
1991 266 54 20.3% 4,386 1.2%
1992 -728 26 -3.6% 4,552 0.6%
1993 5,082 -23 -0.5% 4,641 -0.5%
1994 349 -32 -9.2% 4,684 -0.7%
1995 7,047 10 0.1% 4,724 0.2%
1996 2,666 4 0.2% 4,845 0.1%
1997 1,143 5 0.4% 4,948 0.1%
1998 10,322 21 0.2% 4,940 0.4%
1999 7,159 -17 -0.2% 4,932 -0.3%
2000 4,783 -2 0.0% 4,936 0.0%
2001 3,700 20 0.5% 4,955 0.4%
2002 2,459 -35 -1.4% 4,956 -0.7%
2003 150 -50 -33.3% 4,953 -1.0%
2004 4,768 10 0.2% 4,903 0.2%
2005 4,522 39 0.9% 4,856 0.8%
2006 3,772 56 1.5% 4,814 1.2%
2007 895 40 4.5% 4,802 0.8%
2008 5,850 38 0.6% 4,780 0.8%
2009 14,010 46 0.3% 4,774 1.0%
2010 4,429 9 0.2% 4,790 0.2%
Source: Statistics of general account normal budget and supplemental budget 
(www.mof.go.jp/budget/reference/statitics/data.htm) 
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year as Table 4 shows. The Diet has approved the national reserve fund even when the 
fund had no specific objectives. In fact, the expense has varied, ranging from military 
activities to national election-related expenses, as well as anti-virus infection support 
expense and Anti-Terrorism support activity of the JSDF (Ohishi, 2009, p. 16). For 
instance, in 2001, under the cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special 
Measures Law, the Japanese government dispatched naval ships to the Indian Ocean in 
order to support the Maritime Intercept Operation performed by a multi-national force. 
The Cabinet decided to use the national reserve fund to support this activity because it 
was required to deploy quickly in response to international demand for the activity. This 
activity was funded for three years (Ohishi, 2009, p. 16). However, the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law was supposed to expire in two years, and the JSDF could not 
request the budget for a third year because they could not predict whether the activity 
would continue after the law expired. This is one reason they have had to use the national 
reserve fund for three years.  
In contrast to the U.S. contingency fund, the national reserve fund does not have a 
particular purpose when the normal budget is formulated. The fund becomes available up 
to the designated amount in advance if all the Cabinet members agree to use the national 
reserve fund. As Article 87 states, the Cabinet must report all payments from the reserve 
fund to the Cabinet. The Cabinet, as a check function, approves the expense of the 
reserve fund, but this is not an effective method from the control perspective. In fact, the 
Diet disapproved the expenditure of the national reserve fund four times in the past. 
(Ohishi, 2009, p. 13) It could be said that the national reserve fund inherently has the 
potential for misuse or undesirable use of the fund for the Diet and the nation.  
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Table 4.   National Reserve Fund in Japan. 
C. COMBINED USE 
As mentioned in previous sections, the Japanese budget system has two ways to 
fund a contingency. Practically speaking, the national reserve fund and supplemental 
budget are complementing each other. For example, the disaster relief activities following 
the Great East Japan Earthquake were mainly funded by supplemental budget, but the 
supplemental budget includes the disaster relief reserve fund in case unexpected events 
happen in the process of the recovery and reconstruction activity (Sakiyama, 2012, p. 6). 
On the other hand, almost every year, unused national reserve funds requested by normal 
budgets are changed into a financial resource of the supplemental budget (Ohishi, 2009, p. 







Year total Expense Usage % 
of NB
1990 350 -25 325 323.9 93%
1991 150 0 150 144.5 96%
1992 350 -150 200 103.7 30%
1993 350 -200 150 111.3 32%
1994 350 -200 150 148.5 42%
1995 350 -150 200 57.8 17%
1996 350 -150 200 198.6 57%
1997 350 -200 150 22.1 6%
1998 350 -200 150 3.9 1%
1999 350 -150 200 10.6 3%
2000 350 -150 200 48.6 14%
2001 350 -100 250 124.7 36%
2002 350 -150 200 35.8 10%
2003 350 -100 250 131.9 38%
2004 350 -50 300 110.7 32%
2005 350 -50 300 110.8 32%
2006 350 -100 250 29.8 9%
2007 350 -100 250 59.7 17%
2008 350 -100 250 29.7 8%
(Bilion Yen)
Note: Except 1991, reserve fund is reduced when supplemental budget is 
enacted, and the money is allocated to specific program.
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most years, and it transfers to a supplemental budget as a financial resource. The 
supplemental budget funds JMOD activity most years as Table 3 shows. All these facts 
indicate that the supplemental budget and the national reserve fund are used in 
combination. 
D. SUMMARY 
The Japanese supplemental budget system is similar to the U.S. specific 
supplemental appropriation method because they have a similar reimbursement style 
based on actual cost data and because the supplemental budget needs approval of the Diet 
and Congress. Regarding a national reserve fund, the concept that prepares money 
quickly for an unexpected event is the same as the contingency fund. Different from the 
U.S. contingency funds, the national reserve fund in Japan does not have a particular 
purpose when it is budgeted. Moreover, the national reserve fund only requires 
subsequent approval of the Diet.    
This chapter introduced the Japanese budget system possibly adapted to 
contingency situations. The next chapter addresses conclusions and recommendations.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The research question answered by this thesis is as follows:  
In the event of an emergency, such as contingent incidents, disasters, and 
wars, how should a government control the provision of adequate and 
timely budgets to the military? 
The U.S. government and Congress provide for contingency funds which can be 
used for emergencies in the base-year budget. Contingency funds respond to the time-
sensitive requirement for funds rather than adequacy of funds. If contingency funds 
cannot provide adequate money, which means that the event is serious enough to deplete 
contingency funds, supplemental appropriations are requested and enacted. Contingency 
funds are basically controlled by specific regulations, but the regulations cannot eliminate 
the misuse of funds as seen in the cases of the DERF and the OCOTF. Regarding the 
budgeting process of supplemental appropriations, emergency processes skip some 
budget development steps while the normal budget development process gives a certain 
measure of control. Important findings in this thesis show that the contingency fund and 
national reserve fund are more likely to be misused than a supplemental budget, and the 
supplemental budget is more likely to be misused than a normal budget because these 
funds and budgets skip the control process. Therefore, the type of budget request must be 
re-evaluated continuously as time passes after a contingency event has happened. This 
period of review allows the government to correct information about the event when the 
event lasts, and they can budget accordingly. The federal government and Congress make 
the decision and must assume the risk of skipped steps and limited controllability.  
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR JAPAN 
First, based on recent experience, the government of Japan should set aside 4.3% 
of the national reserve fund for forthcoming military contingency events, and it should 
prepare several feasible scenarios of contingency events such as maritime security 
operations. Based on that scenario, a guideline regarding the fund should be prepared to 
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keep control of the expense. Generally, the national reserve fund is reduced by a 
supplemental budget and is allocated to other programs. Once the fund is allocated to 
specific programs, it is hard to re-allocate it to contingency events in a timely manner 
without enacting supplemental budget. The Japanese government allocates supplemental 
budget to JMOD every year. Of course, JMOD has specific and inevitable reasons to 
request supplemental budget every year. However, focusing on the amount of the 
defense-related supplemental portion (column 3 on Table 3), the average amount of 
supplemental defense budget a year was 15 billion yen for the last 20 years. Table 4 
shows that the national reserve fund was budgeted 350 billion yen every year for the last 
20 years. Thus, it is reasonable to set aside 15 billion yen or 4.3% of national reserve 
fund for forthcoming military contingency events.  
Second, the government of Japan should use the supplemental budget and national 
reserve fund together so as to provide enough money. As the Great East Japan 
Earthquake case indicates, the Japanese government has the ability to manage the 
supplemental budget and national reserve fund together. From a control perspective, rules 
and good controls can be established in disaster contingent funding as the DRF case 
indicates. However, the military contingent funding case does not necessarily provide 
controllability of funds. Therefore, the Cabinet of Japan has to operate the national 
reserve fund with effective control according to the OMB-issued specific guidelines and 
criteria for using DERF as in the U.S. case. The Diet has to keep monitoring the usage of 
the funds for the sake of the nation. 
C. LIMITATION OF STUDY 
First, it is difficult to judge adequate budget level for military contingencies 
objectively. Cost report data do not fully tell us whether the funding level was 
satisfactory or not because they are solely quantitative. In order to truly investigate the 
satisfactory level of funding, personal voices of financial managers and service 
commanders need be heard. Although this thesis reviewed contingency funding based on 
GAO reports, it is still limited in its ability to prove the adequacy of funding in emergent 
battle fields for the above reason. 
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Second, this thesis did not consider the difference between the U.S. presidential 
system and the Japanese parliamentary system in regard to this topic. Generally speaking, 
in countries with a parliamentary system, bills proposed by the Cabinet can typically 
either be passed or rejected, whereas in the presidential system, there are usually 
provisions made for the amendment of proposed bills (Gorbanova & Wawro, 2011, p. 12). 
Thus, the differences in political systems may have an effect on the budgeting process 
and control. 
Finally, constitutional background in regard to the military is different between 
the U.S. and Japan. Article 8 of the Constitution of the United States allows for the 
military force, but Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan does not permit a military force. 
This difference may have an impact on internal politics in the governmental entities and 
public attitude about military budget. The internal politics and public opinion affect the 
requirement of military budget control in an emergency. This thesis could not analyze 
this kind of relationship.  
In summary, this chapter provided conclusions and recommendations for Japan 
and addressed the limitation of this research. 
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